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Abstract
Published justifications for weighting characters in parsimony analyses vary tremendously. Some authors argue for weighting a posteriori, some
for a priori, and especially those authors that rely on a falsificationist approach to systematics argue for non-weighting.To find a decision, while
following the falsificationist approach, one first has to investigate the necessary conditions for the possibility of phylogenetic research to estab-
lish an empirical science sensu Popper. A concept of phylogenetic homology together with the criterion of identity is proposed, which refers to
the genealogical relations between individual organisms. From this concept a differentiation of the terms character and character state is pro-
posed, defining each character as a single epistemological argument for the reconstruction of a unique transformation event. Synapomorphy is
distinguished from homology by referring to the relationship between species instead of individual organisms, thus the set of all synapomor-
phies constitutes a subset of the set of all homologies. By examining the structure of characteristics during character analysis and hypothesizing
specific types of transformations responsible for having caused them, a specific degree of severity is assigned to each identity test. It thus pro-
vides a specific degree of corroboration for every hypothesis that successfully passed this test. Since the congruence criterion tests hypotheses
of synapomorphy against each other on grounds of their degree of corroboration gained from the identity test, these different degrees of cor-
roboration determine the specific weights given to characters and character state transformations before the cladistic analysis. This provides a
reasonable justification for an a priori weighting scheme within a falsificationist approach to phylogeny. It also demonstrates the indispensable
necessity of its application.
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The weighting of phylogenetic characters within cladis-
tic analyses, equally or differentially, is a common and
compelling procedure in systematics. The theoretical
justifications for this procedure vary tremendously (Far-
ris 1969, Neff 1986, Carpenter 1988, Bryant 1989,
Goloboff 1993, Chippindale & Wiens 1994, Allard &
Carpenter 1996, Milinkovitch et al. 1996, Kluge 1997b,
Björklund 1999, Källersjö et al. 1999, Wenzel & Siddall
1999, Broughton et al. 2000, Lutzoni et al. 2000). In this
paper I will try to examine the conditions for the possi-
bility of justifying a weighting scheme within a falsifica-
tionist approach to phylogeny.
The effect of applying Popper’s falsificationist
methodology on phylogenetic inferences has been and
still is extensively discussed (e.g., Farris 1970, 1979,
1983, 1995, 2000; Bock 1973; Wiley 1975; Kitts 1977;
Platnick & Gaffney 1977, 1978a, 1978b; Cracraft 1978;
Platnick 1979; Sober 1993; Kluge & Wolf 1993; Kluge
1997a, b, 1998, 2001; Siddall & Kluge 1997; Rieppel
1999; Brower 2000; De Queiroz & Poe 2001). One cen-
tral statement, however, remains vague. If one wants to
demonstrate that phylogenetic research is an empirical
science sensu Popper, one has to show that phylogenetic
hypotheses are testable, which means that they have to
be open to refutation by empirical evidence. For testing,
those hypotheses and all their embodied definitions
should be stated as clearly and unambiguously as possi-
ble, because only precisely formulated statements can be
critically discussed and severely tested (Popper 1983:
276, 1994: XV, 97–105, 211–218). This refers to the re-
quirement of simplicity of scientific hypotheses which is
tantamount to their degree of falsifiability and their em-
pirical content (Popper 1994: 97–105). The number and
severity of independent tests a hypothesis passes estab-
lish its corroboration, because its degree of falsifiability
is directly dependent on its testability. The testability of
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a hypothesis is, in turn, identical with its empirical con-
tent (Popper 1983: e.g., 230f, 244f; 1994: 213, 339–373).
Thus, the degree of falsifiability sets the upper limit of
the possible degree of corroboration a hypothesis can
gain (Farris 1995).
Let us focus on three different kinds of phylogenetic
hypotheses and discuss whether they are suitable to
serve as falsifiable hypotheses: cladistic hypotheses
(tree hypotheses), synapomorphy hypotheses, and hy-
potheses on phylogenetic homology (sensu Roth 1984).
One has to examine whether these hypotheses are logi-
cally linked or independent of each other, and what
could serve as empirical evidence and relevant back-
ground knowledge for testing them empirically in a fal-
sificationist approach.
Cladistic and synapomorphy hypotheses are state-
ments about descent of organisms and species. To be
able to test such statements one has to have an explana-
tion of what descent means and what species are. The
theory of evolution gives such an explanation by de-
scribing different kinds of evolutionary events: repro-
duction, heredity, and speciation. One has to assume that
such events take place and are part of the relevant back-
ground knowledge if one wants to test concrete state-
ments of descent. But in looking for empirical evidence
for cladistic and synapomorphy hypotheses one has to
concede that no empirical observation clearly and unam-
biguously indicates how organisms are evolutionary re-
lated to one another. I cannot think of any empirical evi-
dence that could definitely falsify such a hypothesis.
Thus, neither a cladistic nor a synapomorphy hypothesis
is directly testable on empirical evidence.
This paper represents an attempt to find the empirical
grounds for testing cladistic hypotheses. This is done by
referring to the concept of homology and interpreting it
from a falsificationist point of view. By examining its
empirical testability and its logical linkage to hypotheses
of synapomorphy, the conditions for empirical testing of
cladistic hypotheses are evaluated. The investigations
result in a modification of the common interpretation of
the application of Popper’s methodology to phylogenet-
ic research and of the procedure of parsimony analyses
of cladistic characters. As a result, the necessity of a pri-
ori weighting of cladistic characters according to the re-
sults of the character analysis is revealed.
Characteristics
If one wants to test a hypothesis against empirical evi-
dence, the relevant area of matter (domain of discourse)
has to be defined beforehand. Therefore, I will use the
term “characteristic” as corresponding to an observa-
tionally distinct unit of an organism. The set of all possi-
ble characteristics then constitutes the area of matter rel-
evant to phylogenetic hypotheses. Such a unit can repre-
sent, for instance, a morphological as well as a fossilized
or molecular structure, a biochemical compound, or a
specific behavior. In every case no connection to the the-
ory of evolution shall be associated with the term “char-
acteristic”.
To be able to use characteristics of organisms as em-
pirical evidence for statements of their history one has to
explain what makes some characteristics ‘historical’.
Again, the theory of evolution helps. Reproduction to-
gether with heredity gives an explanation of the phe-
nomenon of characteristics identical between parents
and their offspring. Transformation by mutation (or re-
combination) is the type of event that explains why off-
spring sometimes yields new characteristics. Thus, the
identity of characteristics can be explained by heredity,
and their difference by transformation. Therefore, one
has to include the possibility of mutations in the as-
sumed background knowledge. This together with the
other types of events – reproduction, heredity and speci-
ation – can be summed up by the term “descent with
modification”. If one projects these types of events onto
time one would expect to perceive organisms bearing
characteristics with specific properties. These properties
would link certain characteristics of one organism with
certain characteristics of other organisms in terms of
having an identical historical origin. This is the essence
of the concept of homology.
Homology
A phylogenetic concept of homology should cover its
theoretical definition and criteria for identification of
homologous characteristics. The theoretical definition of
homology must not contradict the assumed background
knowledge. It should supply the theoretical foundation
for empirical tests of hypotheses of homology and it
should ascribe ‘historical characteristics’ to the organ-
isms – properties which allow conclusions about the
evolutionary history of those organisms. These charac-
teristics would represent the empirical evidence against
which a hypothesis of homology should be tested. The
‘historical characteristics’ are represented by what is
called homologies and differ from the characteristics
used in a purely comparative, not by any means evolu-
tionary approach. This historical interpretation of the
concept of homology is necessary for the possibility of
testing hypotheses about the evolutionary past of lines of
descent of organisms.
A concept of homology should assist in uncovering
the linkage of the historical with the materialistic thus
organismic. This is attempted by means of the theory of
descent with modification, and one receives a theoretical
definition of homology:
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Homologous characteristics are shared character
states of at least two organisms that are derived from a
singular transformation/mutation event in their common
ancestor.
Remarks and conclusions
(1) The definition of homology proposed here uses an
“all-or-none” theoretical criterion, as Patterson (1988)
calls it (“concept of quality” sensu Dover 1987), for
defining the term homology. This should be distin-
guished from what Dover (1987) calls the “concept of
quantity, as in degree of similarity”.
(2) As a consequence, the expression “their common
ancestor” in the above definition refers to the individual
ancestral organism in which the corresponding transfor-
mation took place. In that way, the proposed definition
of homology differs from the most common definition
by referring to the relationships of single individuals
(genealogy) rather than of species. I use this interpreta-
tion of the concept of homology because I want to get as
close as possible conceptually to the empirical observa-
tions relevant to cladistic inferences, and these are, in
my opinion, the empirical entities studied which are
properties of individual organisms.
(3) As evolution and ‘continuing change’ takes place
within the lines of individuals and their offspring, and
since single organisms are the biological entities in
space and time which we study, any effort to reconstruct
their evolution should apply the concept of homology to
lines of individual organisms. Therefore, it is possible to
denote as homologies characteristics that are only shared
by individuals of a single species (intraspecific), as long
as they are derived from a singular mutation event in the
common ancestor of those organisms.
(4) As hypotheses of homology refer to the pattern
causing processes, it is obvious that a complete hypothe-
sis of homology consists of two components:
a) The distribution pattern of the two character states
involved (see the Phylogenetic characters section
below).
b) The transformation hypothesis consisting of the re-
spective character states before and after the transfor-
mation together with the specific type of transforma-
tion-causing mutation event.
Therefore, the proposed concept of homology neces-
sarily entails some sort of taxic as well as transforma-
tional homology (see Hawkins et al. 1997, de Pinna
1991, Patterson 1982).
(5) The result of a mutation event (e.g., an insertion)
might function as the substrate for a subsequent muta-
tion event, where the derived character state of an evolu-
tionarily older character turns into the ancestral charac-
ter state of an evolutionarily younger one. This is a prob-
lem concerning character transformation, hierarchy and
the methodologically claimed independence of phyloge-
netic characters, and it is relevant to the coding of phylo-
genetic characters for data matrices.
For example, Haszprunar (1998) states that “there are
supraspecific homologous structures based on clearly
orthologous genes (e.g., cerebral eyes in metazoans,
limbs of arthropods and vertebrates) which are certainly
not synapomorphies (e.g., Nilsson 1996, Shubin et al.
1997)”. When applying the proposed definition of ho-
mology, one has, in principle, no problem interpreting
this phenomenon without contradiction. The gene in its
totality does not necessarily represent a homologous
character state. Instead, it most probably is a composite
character state (see Fig. 6), especially if it is not 100%
identical. One cannot exclude that it is the result of more
than a single mutation event. In this case, it is possible
that the gene shares a common origin with all Metazoa
in the sense that it (partly) evolved in their common an-
cestor, which would not be equal to a totally homolo-
gous property of such a characteristic. Subsequent muta-
tions within the different clades of the Metazoa probably
changed the function of that gene. These mutations then
resulted in ‘new’ homologies (limbs of arthropods and
limbs of vertebrates).
(6) With this definition it is possible to apply the term
homology also for ‘loss’ character states (contradicting
Haszprunar 1998, de Pinna 1991). ‘Loss’ character
states, however, cannot be identified prior to the cladis-
tic analysis; this can only be done when interpreting the
character state distribution of a rooted most parsimo-
nious tree.
(7) The definition explains the need for a conditional
phrase (“homologues as what?”) for every homology
statement (Bock 1969, 1973; Patterson 1982). This con-
ditional phrase is needed to link the historical (the hy-
pothesized mutation event) to the organismic (the ob-
servable characteristics). This is done by referring to the
common ancestor of the two or more organisms under
comparison, and to the single mutation which took place
in this ancestral organism. The use of this conditional
phrase, which refers to a specific transformation event,
makes a hypothesis of homology empirically testable
and the distinction of character and character state not
only plausible but necessary (see also de Pinna 1991,
Hawkins et al. 1997; contradicting: Bock 1973, Wiley
1981, Schoch 1986, Ax 1987, Patterson 1988).
Phylogenetic characters
Homology links identical characteristics of different or-
ganisms historically by referring to them as to the prod-
uct of a transformation caused by a mutation event in a
common ancestor, inherited by them via a line of repro-
duction. A transformation is recognizable only by per-
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ceiving a difference in a condition found before and after
the transformation.
An unequivocal interpretation of the terms “charac-
ter” and “character state” could be the following:
What we perceive by empirical observations of or-
ganisms are only character states. As Hennig (1966: 89)
states: Character states “are ‘characters’ in the sense that
they distinguish their bearers from one another, but we
must always be aware of the fact that ‘characters ’ that
can be compared are basically only character conditions
... produced by transformation.” As a consequence, a
character, or better a phylogenetic character, cannot it-
self be called homologous since it represents only a hy-
pothesis about which units (character states) should be
compared. The term phylogenetic character somehow
represents the ‘position’ within the organism where the
mutation occurs, and its corresponding transformation.
A phylogenetic character always includes the conditions
before and after a transformation. Therefore, a phyloge-
netic character is always a phylogenetic hypothesis
(Neff 1986). The two conditions, the character states,
are qualitatively different, and are distinguishable as
“ancestral” and “derived”, of which only the derived can
be denoted as being homologous when shared by at least
two organisms. Therefore, a single phylogenetic charac-
ter is only a single argument and as such can only pro-
vide evidence for the homology of the derived character
state of the hypothesized transformation. Independent of
this fact, it is possible that the ancestral character state of
one phylogenetic character represents the derived and
thus homologous character state of another phylogenetic
character (see Remarks and conclusions (5) above,
p. 321). Its homology statement, however, is part of the
argument of the latter and not the former phylogenetic
character.
This conclusion differs from the common usage of the
term homology and is much more strict. Composite phy-
logenetic characters that also contain ancestral details,
or that are ancestral all together, are often also called ho-
mologies (Wägele 1996). However, this practice would
weaken both the historical aspect of the proposed con-
cept and the testability of hypotheses of homology, and
is therefore rejected (see Complexity section below).
One would also have difficulties in stating a single con-
ditional phrase for the homology statement of such a
composite character state, which would represent the re-
sult of more than a single transformation.
Furthermore, the concepts of “phylogenetic charac-
ter” and “character state” advocated here use the two
terms as representing units of evolutionary processes (as
used by, e.g., Lloyd & Calder 1991). It must be distin-
guished from a different concept that uses the two terms
as representing (smallest) units of observation (e.g.,
Giribet & Wheeler 1999), which are called “characteris-
tics” within the present paper.
For the identification of the corresponding character
states that belong to a single phylogenetic character, two
of the three criteria of Remane (1952) should be applied:
similarity of topographical position, that is the “criterion
of position”, and similarity of ontogenetic constraints,
the “criterion of continuity” (although the latter is only
applicable to morphological characteristics). These have
to be applied to make it possible to state a hypothesis of
topographical correspondence (Rieppel 1988) of two or
more different character states, also called the hypothe-
sis of ‘positional homology’ (Swofford et al. 1996, Titus
and Frost 1996), ‘topographic homology’ (Jardine
1969), or ‘provisional homology’ (Giribet & Wheeler
1999). The latter three terms are ambiguous, however,
and therefore in a way unsuitable, because a hypothesis
of ‘positional/topographic/provisional’ homology is not
a hypothesis of a homology according to the applied def-
inition (which on this point agrees with Rieppel 1988
and Brower & Schawaroch 1996). A topographic corre-
spondence merely provides the characteristics that shall
be compared, which represent something like homolo-
calities. Therefore, the term “topographical correspon-
dence” is preferred, which does not necessarily need an
evolutionary framework – Aristoteles already stated hy-
potheses of topographical correspondence when giving
characteristics of different organisms the same name.
In this sense a phylogenetic character represents a hy-
pothesis of topographical correspondence consisting of
two different character states of which one is interpreted
as representing a hypothesis of homology, rendering a
phylogenetic character a phylogenetic hypothesis.
Testing homology: identity
A criterion for identification of homologous characteris-
tics has to fulfil the following conditions:
(1) It helps to distinguish between homologous and
non-homologous characteristics.
(2) It does not contradict the assumed background
knowledge that is descent with modification; rather, it is
deducible from it and from the theoretical definition of
homology.
(3) It offers the opportunity for severe tests of a hy-
pothesis of homology, thereby rendering phylogenetic
inference an empirical science.
Assuming that reproduction, heredity and transforma-
tion are the only types of evolutionary events taking
place in time, one can conclude the following: if a char-
acter state X of organism A is transformed by a mutation
and inherited by the offspring of A without any subse-
quent transformation of X, and if the offspring repro-
duces without any subsequent transformation of X, then
it holds true that X is identical for all descendants of A
which inherited X.
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Characteristics of two or more organisms that origi-
nated in only a single mutation event in their common
ancestor should be identical. Thus, a homologous charac-
teristic is characterized by its identity over all organisms
bearing this characteristic. Characteristics of two organ-
isms that do not have identical inheritable properties can-
not have the same origin and can therefore not be ex-
plained by a single transformation, respectively. There-
fore, identity is the test criterion for every hypothesis of
homology. This criterion forms the basis for the test of
any hypothesis of homology. It is applied a priori, before
the construction of a cladogram. As a consequence, hy-
potheses of homology are principally falsifiable.
Homologous character states have to be identical if they
are the result of the same single mutation event. The term
“identity” is unambiguously applicable with nucleotide se-
quence data since this type of data is one-dimensional
(Woese 1987) – at least as long as one does not consider
any possible secondary structures of the molecule as a
character state. Regarding morphological data this does
not apply. However, one could still recognize morphologi-
cal characteristics that share identical ‘qualities’ – identical
structural properties called ‘homomorphies’ – even if their
surficial shapes are not identical. In this case, only the
identical quality of the morphological characteristic – e.g.,
a single structural aspect of it – represents the empirical ev-
idence and the basis for stating a hypothesis of homology.
Some authors claim that hypotheses of homology
cannot be subjected to severe tests but can only be esti-
mated (e.g. Haszprunar 1998). They assign a relative
probability of homology, and hence distance themselves
from the “all-or-none” theoretical criterion. It is true that
there is no such thing as a decisive test which could re-
sult in a conclusive “yes” or “no”. But this holds true for
any empirical hypothesis since there is no basis for veri-
fying any kind of empirical statement (Popper 1983).
Still, there is an empirical basis which helps to decide
which of all the possible hypotheses of homology are to
be preferred in light of the present empirical knowledge,
and this lies in the different explanatory powers of the
competing hypotheses. The explanatory power of a
hypothesis depends on the outcome and the number and
severity of independent tests the hypothesis passed, and
thus its degree of corroboration (Popper 1983, 1994).
Although the importance of character analysis a priori
to cladistic analysis has been stressed by many authors
(e.g., Neff 1986, Bryant 1989, Wägele 1994, Haszprunar
1998), it is often overlooked that characters and charac-
ter states which are used in the cladistic analysis are al-
ready hypotheses themselves and that they had been sub-
ject to tests a priori the cladistic analysis (Neff 1986) –
tests like the one using the criterion of identity.
The criterion of identity indeed provides the basis for
a test (like similarity in Patterson 1982, Rieppel 1988;
contradicting de Pinna 1991) which is more or less se-
vere, depending on the type of character. Most of all the
hypotheses of homology that are theoretically possible
in the light of the background knowledge fail this test
when exposed to the experience gained in the character
analysis.
It is possible that not all homologies in the sense of
the definition pass this empirical test. The test is, howev-
er, still necessary if homology should be more than a
plain theoretical concept which is empirically empty.
One could think of a set of characteristics that are ho-
mologous in the sense of the definition. When applying
the test, subsets of this set are constituted (Fig. 1). The
subsets consist on one hand of those hypotheses of ho-
mology that are of use for phylogenetic inference be-
cause of their high empirical content (because of the ex-
istence of a certain amount of potential falsifiers), and
on the other hand of those that are of no use because they
cannot be tested (because they lack a sufficient amount
of potential falsifiers). They thus consist of phylogeneti-
cally informative and non-informative characters, re-
spectively.
Synapomorphy
In which way are homology and synapomorphy logical-
ly linked to one another?
A synapomorphy is a character state shared by two
taxa, that is derived from a singular transformation event
in their common ancestor, the stem species of the two
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Fig. 1. The set of true homologous characteristics derived from the
theoretical definition of homology, and the two subsets derived from
the criteria of identification. The subsets depend on the empirical
testability of the true homologous characteristics.
taxa (Hennig 1966, Ax 1987). The two taxa constitute
sister taxa.
While homology is a concept that focuses on the or-
ganismic level and the history of reproductive lines of
individual organisms, synapomorphy is a concept that is
applicable on the species level, thus focusing on the his-
tory of lines of species.
According to the definition of synapomorphy stated
above, a homologous characteristic shared only by organ-
isms of a single species (intraspecific) cannot represent a
synapomorphy, since a synapomorphy must be shared by
at least two species (interspecific). And even if a homolo-
gous characteristic is shared by two or more species, it
does not necessarily have to represent a synapomorphy.
One could think, for instance, of the following scenario
which is perfectly consistent with the theory of evolution
(for an illustration see Fig. 2): consider a species X which
by geological activities has been split into two popula-
tions. The latter are potentially cross-fertile, but because
of a topographic barrier there is no gene flow between
them. In one population a mutation occurs leading to the
transformation of a characteristic (Fig. 2: from “square”
to “circle”). In exactly the same population another trans-
formation takes place splitting this population into two
parts which are reproductively isolated, constituting a
speciation. This speciation event gives rise to the two
species C and Y. At this point in the scenario, one would
thus observe species C with a single population. Its indi-
viduals bear the newly transformed characteristic (“cir-
cle”). Furthermore, one would observe species Y with
two populations which are geographically separated but
potentially cross-fertile. Individuals of one of the two
populations bear the newly transformed characteristic
(“circle”) and those of the other population the ancestral
characteristic (“square”), although they both belong to the
same species Y. In another step of this scenario, a specia-
tion event takes place in species Y, producing species A
and B. Consequently, the scenario ends with three
species, of which A and B represent sister taxa and the
adelphotaxon of C. The “circle”characteristic is a homol-
ogy between individuals of species B and C. However, it
does not represent a synapomorphy, because species B
and C are not sister taxa.
One can thus conclude that a given homology is not
necessarily also a synapomorphy, but that any synapo-
morphy is always also a homology. The set of all
synapomorphies is, therefore, a subset of the set of all
homologies and, logically speaking, homology as de-
fined in this paper cannot be equivalent to synapomor-
phy (contradicting Patterson 1982, de Pinna 1991,
Brower & Schawaroch 1996).
In correspondence with the term “phylogenetic char-
acter”, which refers to a transformation event leading to
a homologous character state, the term “cladistic charac-
ter” is introduced. A cladistic character is a hypothesis of
a transformation event which has led to a synapomor-
phic character state. In this sense, only cladistic charac-
ters bear information on the evolutionary relationship of
species. They are a subset of the set of phylogenetic
characters, which also bear information on the evolu-
tionary relationship of individual organisms.
Testing synapomorphy: congruence
As a consequence, one is confronted with the question
whether an empirical criterion exists to distinguish
synapomorphies from non-synapomorphies.
If one considers the evolutionary events of reproduc-
tion, heredity and mutation together with speciation and
projects them onto time, one can expect the distribution
pattern of apomorphic character states between species
to be structured hierarchically. This distribution pattern
serves as evidence for nested groupings of species char-
acterized by sharing specific apomorphic character
states. Furthermore, those groupings have to be congru-
ent with one another. Hence, synapomorphic character
states are not randomly distributed. This criterion is
called “congruence” (Patterson 1988, de Pinna 1991,
Lipscomb 1992, Kluge 1997a; equivalent to “criterion
of coincidence” of Wagner 1986).
With this criterion, hypotheses of synapomorphy can
only be tested against other hypotheses of synapomor-
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Fig. 2. Evolutionary relationship of three hypothetical taxa A, B and
C, of which A and B represent sister taxa. x, y and z stand for three or-
ganisms with their individual lineages of descent (genealogy). Organ-
isms y and z share a characteristic • (‘circle’) which derives from a
transformation event in their common ancestor X. Thus, the charac-
teristic ‘•‘ represents a homology. Since organism x does not have
this characteristic and the latter never appeared within its line of de-
scent, and since taxa A and B are sister taxa, characteristic ‘•‘ cannot
represent a synapomorphy.
phy while applying the logical sentence of contradiction
and the methodological sentence of parsimony. In a nut-
shell: if there are two different character states hypothe-
sized as being synapomorphic and their distribution
within the species classifies two contradicting sets, at
least one of those hypotheses must be wrong in the light
of the background knowledge. Thus, at least one of them
must be reinterpreted ad hoc as being homoplasious
(Kluge 1997a, 1998) or homologous, but not synapo-
morphic. Thus, if a set of hypotheses of synapomorphy
fails to pass the congruence test, the entire set is falsified
– not all of the hypotheses can be true in the light of the
background knowledge. In terms of testability: the more
parsimonious the hypothesized species relationships and
character state optimizations are, the better (Farris 1970,
and see below). Thus, only sets of hypotheses of synapo-
morphy are principally falsifiable at this level of infer-
ence – single hypotheses of synapomorphy cannot be
tested by the congruence test.
Many authors call hypotheses of homology that pass
this test ‘secondary homology’ (e.g., de Pinna 1991;
equivalent to ‘homology’ sensu Rieppel 1988; see also
‘corroborated homology’ of Brower & Schawaroch
1996); but interpreting the congruence criterion more
strictly, it is actually not homology that is tested, but
synapomorphy.
From these tested hypothetical synapomorphies a
cladogram is derived (Bock 1973). The cladogram
which results from a parsimony analysis represents the
optimum fit for the hypotheses of synapomorphy within
a frame of a hierarchical character state distribution in
terms of parsimony, constituting the presently most cor-
roborated cladistic hypothesis. This reveals the logical
linkage between the three different types of phylogenet-
ic hypotheses mentioned above: the hypotheses of ho-
mology and synapomorphy, and the cladistic hypothe-
ses. Furthermore, it explains the central role of the con-
cept of synapomorphy for cladistic analyses. The fact
that the step from tested homologies to tested synapo-
morphies is not a trivial one is, for instance, illustrated
by the lineage sorting and the gene-tree/species-tree
problem (e.g., Page & Charleston 1997).
For effectively performing the congruence test, the
amount of hypotheses of homology that are no synapo-
morphies and that pass the first test must be minimal, so
that one can reasonably test the logical consistency of
sets of hypotheses of synapomorphy.
Since synapomorphies are always homologies, the
identity test is also a test of hypotheses of synapomor-
phy. Only those synapomorphy hypotheses that success-
fully pass this test may take part in the congruence test.
The outcome of the cladistic analysis is not indepen-
dent of the results of the test of identity, and therefore
also not independent of the character analysis (see also
Neff 1986). This is due to the fact that the tested hy-
potheses of synapomorphy themselves, together with the
methodological criterion of parsimony and the logical
sentence of contradiction, are the basis for this analysis.
Parsimony is needed, because without it there would be
no methodological criterion which would help in choos-
ing which of the alternative sets of hypotheses that
passed the congruence test should be preferred – if an ad
hoc reinterpretation of hypotheses is necessary, there is
always more than one alternative reinterpretation which
will pass the congruence test. If two or more sets of hy-
potheses of synapomorphy are congruent, parsimony
prefers the set of hypotheses that has the highest sum of
degrees of corroboration gained in the identity test. That
is the reason why the results of the test of identity have
to be employed in the test of congruence.
Because of the methodological principle of parsimony
(meant to include not necessarily only the cladistic
method of Maximum Parsimony), there is no non-weight-
ing of characters in a cladistic analysis (contradicting,
e.g., Kluge 1997a). It also explains why one has no choice
but to weight cladistic characters in a cladistic analysis,
equally or differentially. The function of parsimony with-
in this test is not primarily to minimize the requirements
for ad hoc hypotheses of homoplasy for the most parsi-
monious hierarchy, but to maximize its degree of corrob-
oration within the given setting of evidence, hypothesis
and background knowledge (contradicting Kluge 1997a,
b; Farris 1983) and to minimize the corroboration for all
character transformations that have to be interpreted ad
hoc as homoplasies. The total degree of corroboration of
the cladistic hypothesis is not only dependent on the num-
ber of ad hoc hypotheses of homoplasy, but also on the re-
sults of the first and the second test.
Hence, for inferring the cladistic hypothesis with the
maximum explanatory power it is necessary to include
the degrees of corroboration of every single hypothesis
of synapomorphy, because they constitute the degree of
corroboration of the cladistic hypothesis. Minimizing
the number of ad hoc hypotheses is not sufficient in that
context.
This is the only but decisive theoretical reason for
weighting characters and character state transformations
differentially a priori to the cladistic analyses in a refuta-
tionist program of cladistic research. Only in the case of
different degrees of corroboration of hypotheses of
synapomorphy which have successfully passed the first
test is it necessary to give them differential weights be-
fore they are subjected to the second test (in contradic-
tion to Kluge 1997a, b).
Thus, weighting characters is not a question of esti-
mating some intrinsic quality of the character (Neff
1986) in an essentialist manner, but a question of the de-
gree of corroboration of hypotheses of synapomorphy
gained in the character analysis.
It should be mentioned that neither of those two tests
is truly decisive (see also Patterson 1988; Kluge 1997a,
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1998), because not only synapomorphies/homologies
but also convergences can be identical. As a conse-
quence, identical convergences would pass the first test
and could also be congruent with other hypotheses of
synapomorphy, which would mean that they would also
pass the second test.
If the identity test is not interpreted as a test of synapo-
morphy or homology (see de Pinna’s 1991 similarity cri-
terion), the congruence test together with parsimony
would not constitute an empirical test in cladistic analy-
ses. Because the congruence test and the principle of par-
simony test hypotheses against hypotheses on the basis of
their specific degrees of corroboration, they all together
have to have passed an empirical test beforehand, as their
degree of corroboration would otherwise equal zero. And
no matter how many hypotheses of synapomorphy con-
tradict a single other hypothesis – if they all have zero
corroboration one has no basis for deciding which of the
two sets of hypotheses is to be preferred. It is zero versus
zero. This is due to the fact that the congruence test is no
direct empirical test but a test against the consistency of
all hypotheses in question. If this test shall indirectly be
an empirical test, the tested hypotheses must have gained
explanatory power beforehand. This explanatory power is
obtained by successfully passing the identity test.
A supplementary objection remains to be stated: the
quality of the hypotheses of topographical correspon-
dence also influences the degree of corroboration of the
involved hypotheses of synapomorphy which have
passed the identity test, and it might also represent an-
other factor that has to be taken into consideration when
evaluating weights of phylogenetic characters and char-
acter state transformations.
How to weight
“The wish to grade hypotheses according to the tests
passed by them is legitimate: I do not know of any seri-
ous objection” (Popper 1983: 220).
Popper’s hypothetico-deductive approach consists of
three elements: background knowledge, hypothesis and
empirical evidence (Fig. 3).
The background knowledge (Popper 1983, 1994) is
relevant knowledge that is accepted, while the hypothe-
sis is tested. It may include initial conditions. The impor-
tant point is that the background knowledge has to be
consistent with the hypothesis (Popper 1983: 236). From
this background knowledge one can deduce a logical set
of all theoretically possible empirical statements that do
not contradict the chosen background knowledge. The
empirical hypothesis is the hypothesis one wants to test.
It must not contradict the background knowledge. If one
deduces the theoretically possible empirical statements
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Fig. 3. A) The logical rela-
tionship of the background
knowledge to its possible
empirical statements. B) The
function of the hypothesis
within the hypothetico-de-
ductive setting. For further
explanation see text.
that are consistent with the conjunction of background
knowledge and hypothesis, one receives a subset of the
former set. This subset includes all empirical statements
that are predicted by the hypothesis (‘predictions’ or
‘retrodictions’). Those statements that only belong to the
former set, and that thus contradict the hypothesis but
not the background knowledge, constitute the set of po-
tential falsifiers of the hypothesis within the given hypo-
thetico-deductive setting. It is this particular set against
which the hypothesis is tested. One can, therefore, say
that the more empirical statements a hypothesis pro-
hibits, i.e. the more it ventures, the more severely it is
testable and the more it potentially explains. If at all, the
testability (or falsifiability, depending on which view
one takes) of a hypothesis can therefore only be mea-
sured by the content of the set of potential falsifiers.
And, following Popper, the empirical content of a hy-
pothesis can be equated to the degree of testability and
the degree of falsifiability (sensu Popper 1983, 1994).
The degree of corroboration of a hypothesis is less de-
pendent on the number of tests passed, which is equal to
the total amount of supporting evidence, than on the
severity of each test. The severity of the tests depends on
the amount of accredited potential falsifiers, which in its
turn depends on the degree of falsifiability or, in other
words, on the degree of testability of the hypothesis
which is directly dependent on its empirical content.
Popper (1983: 245) proposes the convention that corrob-
orability should equal testability and empirical content.
The empirical content is “a measure of the class of its
falsifiers” (Popper 1983: 231) and the hypothesis with
the ‘larger’ class of falsifiers is the hypothesis with the
larger empirical content. (Popper 1994: 77, 211–218;
1983: 230, 244)
The degree of corroboration a hypothesis gains by
passing an empirical test can, therefore, be equated to
the amount of potential falsifiers that are accredited by
this test, and which constitute its severity.
Measuring the class of falsifiers of a hypothesis
In principle, it is not possible to give an absolute and ob-
jective measure of the degree of falsifiability of a hypothe-
sis or the severity of a test. However, in some special cases
a relative measure of the amount of falsifiers accredited by
a test of two alternative hypotheses can be given.
Hypothesis x has a higher degree of corroboration tha
hypothesis y if – and only if – the class of possible falsi-
fiers of hypothesis x includes the possible falsifiers of
hypothesis y as a true subclass (Popper 1994: 80) and
both hypotheses have passed the same severe test.
Unfortunately, this concept is not applicable to hy-
potheses of homology and synapomorphy, as they repre-
sent historical and therefore singular statements, and as
every such hypothesis has its own and individual objec-
tively incommensurable class of possible falsifiers.
Thus, within a falsificationist approach, there is no
strictly objective foundation for the introduction of a
quantitative system to determine the severity of tests, the
degrees of corroboration of hypotheses, or an a priori
weighting system of cladistic characters, respectively. In
this sense, Kluge is right when concluding that there is
no theoretical basis for a priori character weighting
within a falsificationist approach (Kluge 1997b), and
that an exact value for the degree of corroboration of a
hypothesis cannot be determined (Kluge 1997a).
Nevertheless, a priori weights have to be applied in-
evitably if one wants to perform a cladistic analysis on
empirical grounds. Such weighting is either an equal or a
differential weighting. Due to the fact that hypotheses of
synapomorphy are tested against one another within the
cladistic analysis, their respective degree of corrobora-
tion represents the decisive criterion in the case of con-
flict for the cladistic analysis (see above). The degrees of
corroboration of those hypotheses of synapomorphy
which have passed the test of identity are, therefore,
compared with one another quantitatively. This compar-
ison is immanent to any weighting scheme – whether
equal or differential. For this reason one has to weight!
So, we still have to ask what one should do.
One should attempt to approximate the degrees of
severity of each identity test.
One could categorize the possible falsifiers of a hy-
pothesis into “classes of identity”, classes of identical
units of observation. The resulting number of classes
would be directly dependent on the number of theoreti-
cally possible different results of a single mutation
event. Because hypotheses of synapomorphy refer to
mutation events, the possible falsifiers of these hypothe-
ses, and therefore also the units of observation which
come into question, have to refer to the possible results
of the hypothesized mutation event.
For an ‘empty’ data matrix this would mean (Fig. 4)
that, potentially, many different kinds of hypotheses of
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Fig. 4. A matrix for n taxa and m sites of topographical correspon-
dence. For details see text.
synapomorphy could be stated for every single position
in a column of a matrix. Such a statement, for instance
for site P1, position X11 and an observable characteristic
y, could look as follows: “X11 is the result of a mutation
event that has taken place in the last common ancestor of
taxon1 and all the other taxa that share the same type of
character state y for the site P1 of topographical corre-
spondence”. The statement would be falsified according
to the criterion of identity if, and only if, X11 ± y. Thus,
the first test of synapomorphy is independent of the
number and the sample of taxa used in the data matrix
and the cladistic analysis. Falsifiers are all character
states that are non-y, and the number of different falsi-
fiers is determined by the number of possible character
states of the corresponding mutation.
An example for the classification into classes of iden-
tity can be taken from molecular data. For instance for a
nucleotide substitution, every individual nucleotide is
represented by its corresponding class of identity – A for
adenine, G for guanine, C for cytosine, and T for
thymine. One would thus receive three classes of obser-
vationally different, possible falsifiers for a given se-
quence position, because there are four possible results
from any nucleotide substitution event. One of them
would stand for the hypothesis and the remaining ones
would be the potential falsifiers in the sense of the crite-
rion of identity. With such a classification one can, at
least in theory, measure the classes of possible different
results of a mutation event quantitatively, thus measur-
ing the number of classes of different falsifying state-
ments for every hypothesis of synapomorphy. These
classes of identity would be true subclasses of the class
of all possible falsifiers of a hypothesis.
If one wishes to follow the convenient phylogenetic
interpretation of Popper’s falsificationist approach and,
therefore, refuses to consider process probabilities as
part of the relevant background knowledge, one could,
as a ‘null hypothesis’, ascribe every such class of identi-
ty the same weight in terms of empirical content, which
would lead to an equal weighting of these classes. This
is, in my opinion, not a conclusive interpretation of Pop-
per’s approach, but I will follow it here because of its
simplicity – one could also think of a probabilistic inter-
pretation in terms of process probabilities of transforma-
tion events which would lead to an unequal weighting of
these classes. Nevertheless, the severity of every test of
identity could then be quantified, which would in turn
quantify the degrees of corroboration of every hypothe-
sis of synapomorphy that successfully passed the first
test. These weights should be included in the cladistic
test where the most parsimonious character state distri-
bution for a given phylogeny is inferred (Fig. 5 gives an
overview of the whole procedure, and Fig. 6 shows the
relationships of the different concepts and terms applied
in this procedure). In the case of two incongruent hy-
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Fig. 5. Scheme of the procedure of cladistic research and differential
a priori character weighting. For details see text.
potheses of synapomorphy, their degrees of corrobora-
tion from the first test give the basis to decide which hy-
pothesis is to be preferred, i.e. which hypothesis has
maximum explanatory power and which hypothesis
should be reinterpreted ad hoc as a homoplasy. The de-
grees of all the other hypotheses of synapomorphy and
their most parsimonious character state distribution
must, of course, be taken into account to receive the
globally most parsimonious solution.
Transferring this concept to the example of the
‘empty’ data matrix would lead to the following result:
when the matrix has been ‘filled’ with empirical content
derived from the character analysis, every position of a
column entails only a part of one hypothesis of a puta-
tive synapomorphy. This means that, within this step, all
other possible hypotheses of synapomorphy are exclud-
ed from this special site of topographical correspon-
dence, and are hence falsified. When the character states
are coded and filled into the data matrix the correspond-
ing hypotheses of synapomorphy have therefore already
passed the first test. The result of this test should be in-
cluded in the data matrix by giving every cladistic char-
acter a weight corresponding to the severity of the
passed test (or, in applying a step matrix, a weight for the
corresponding transformation, respectively).
Many authors postulate the reduction of the back-
ground knowledge to descent with modification only to
avoid other conditions relating to pattern and process.
This facilitates the critical inference of other theories on
the basis of the results of the phylogenetic inference
without the problem of circular reasoning when, for in-
stance, applying rates and patterns of character evolu-
tion (Kluge 1997a, see also Sluys 1996). Giving each of
the classes of identical falsifiers the same weight would
agree with this claim.
One can thus summarize: the severity of the first
synapomorphy test is dependent on the character type,
which is the type of hypothesized transformation event,
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Fig. 6. Relations between the different concepts and terms applied in the procedure of cladistic research. The concepts of homology and
synapomorphy are derived from descent with modification in which synapomorphy represents a special case of homology. Each of the two con-
cepts consists of a theoretical definition and criteria of identification which in turn are test-criteria of putative homologies/synapomorphies.The
two concepts, together with descent with modification, represent relevant background knowledge for the procedure of cladistic research. The
two character concepts, phylogenetic and cladistic character, together with their two character states constitute the linkage between the em-
pirical basis (the relevant observations) and the epistemic concepts of homology and synapomorphy.As such, they represent empiric arguments
for the reconstruction of the genealogy of individual organisms or the reconstruction of the phylogeny of species, respectively.
and on the number of different possible results. Besides,
the following two assumptions have to be added to the
relevant background knowledge: (1) character types can
be classified according to the type of mutation/transfor-
mation which caused them and the constraints resulting
from the inference of the topographical correspondence;
and (2) the classes of observationally identical potential
character states all have the same information content
and are therefore weighted equally. The former is al-
ready necessary for stating a hypothesis of topographical
correspondence, especially when analyzing molecular
data. The latter represents a convention or a null hypoth-
esis, respectively, which neglects the effect that the con-
sideration of different process probabilities would have
an effect on the outcome of the analysis. It is the crucial
assumption of the entire weighting scheme that has been
proposed and requires severe testing.
However, the proposed classification at least provides
a clear and unambiguous foundation for all kinds of dif-
ferent tests of a priori weighting systems and for dis-
cussing their advantages and disadvantages.
Complexity
Complexity is a term applied when interpreting charac-
teristics, especially morphological characteristics. How-
ever, complexity depends on the individual eye of the
observer. An event with a rather simple structure is often
perceived as being very complex as long as one does not
know its mechanics and causality. In this sense, com-
plexity would be a concept extremely open to subjectivi-
ty, which belongs methodologically rather to description
than to analysis.
If one wants to use the term complexity in the context
of justifying weights of characters at all, it should be
used in the sense of complexity of the transformation
event to which the severity of the first test is related,
rather than the complexity of the organismic structure of
the characteristics (contradicting Neff 1986, Patterson
1988). One should not simply equate structural com-
plexity with the complexity of an underlying event.
There is no theoretical nor methodological basis avail-
able yet for weighting characters simply according to
their structural complexity within a refutationist pro-
gram of phylogenetic inference.
Some authors (e.g., Wägele 1995, 1996) state that the
phylogenetic information content of a character state is
higher when it is caused by a larger number of specific
mutations, constituting a complex molecular character.
This would represent a useful approach to character
weighting as long as history, and thus evolution, ends
after such a multitude of mutation events and all muta-
tions take place in a single ancestor species only. How-
ever, if these two conditions are not met, it is difficult to
treat such a ‘composite character state’ correctly. A sin-
gle mutation event in only one of the positions where the
former mutations occurred would already transform it
into a new ‘composite character state’. Much of the phy-
logenetic information would be lost in this type of char-
acter state coding (Fig. 7). As a consequence, this new
‘composite character state’ has to be given the same
weight as the old ‘composite character state’, since the
former is the result of a multitude of mutation events in
the same way as the latter, even though only a single mu-
tation separates the apomorphic from its plesiomorphic
condition. Hence, this newly transformed ‘composite
character state’ would support only a single phylogenet-
ic grouping – and with an artificially high weight – al-
though phylogenetic information for another grouping is
available. Information on, for instance, a sister group re-
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Fig. 7. Consequences and problems with the coding of results of
multiple, independent transformation events as ‘composite charac-
ters’ or ‘composite character states’. X and Y represent sister taxa, O
the nearest related outgroup; p recodes three independent ple-
siomorphic character states which are represented by p1–p3; q re-
codes three independent synapomorphic character states which are
represented by q1–q3 and which support the sister group relationship
of the taxa X and Y; r recodes two synapomorphic character states
which are represented by q1 and q2 and which support the sister
group relationship of the taxa X and Y, and one autapomorphic char-
acter state r1 which supports the monophyly of taxon X. When using
the character states p1–p3, q1–q3 and r1 in a cladistic analysis, one
would reconstruct the true phylogeny of X, Y and O. If one uses the
recoded ‘composite character states’ p, q and r, one would not be
able to reconstruct this relationship: although the ‘composite charac-
ter state’ r supports the true monophyletic condition of taxon X, it is
only a single transformation (r1) that empirically supports this rela-
tionship and not three. This coding would, thus, lead to an artificially
high weighting of r. The ‘composite character state’ q would support
a monophyletic condition of taxon Y without any empirical evidence,
and the sister group relationship of taxa X and Y is not at all support-
ed by that type of character coding, in spite of the fact that empirical
evidence (q1 and q2) does exist.
lationship could thus be lost (Fig. 7). Furthermore, in the
worst case, this coding could lead to support for artificial
groupings. This problem can be caused when plesiomor-
phic and apomorphic character states are combined and
form a ‘composite character state’. And as the qualities
‘plesiomorphic’ and ‘apomorphic’ can only be assigned
a posteriori to the cladistic analysis, such a ‘composite
character state’ coding should be avoided whenever pos-
sible. The described problem affects morphological as
well as molecular characters.
Final comments
To demonstrate that phylogenetic research is an empiri-
cal science sensu Popper, the empirical basis for tests of
cladistic hypotheses has to be revealed, and thus their
logical linkage to hypotheses of synapomorphy and ho-
mology. It is necessary to go back to the concept of ho-
mology to get as close as possible conceptually to the
relevant empirical observations.
The proposed concept of phylogenetic homology to-
gether with the criterion of identity represents a setting
suitable for direct empirical testing within a falsifica-
tionist approach. This is due to the concept property of
being related to the individual history of the organisms
studied and to their corresponding genealogy. It utilizes
the distribution pattern of identical and different charac-
teristics of the investigated organisms to state hypothe-
ses of the history of those characteristics and, therefore,
indirectly of the organisms carrying them. Thus, from
the reconstructed history of the characteristics one infers
the history of the organisms bearing those characteris-
tics, and from the latter the history of the corresponding
species. By examining the structure of characteristics
and hypothesizing specific types of transformations re-
sponsible for having caused them, a specific degree of
severity is assigned to each identity test, and thus a spe-
cific degree of corroboration for every hypothesis that
passes this test.
Character analysis is, therefore, the step within the
procedure of phylogenetic research during which a di-
rect test on empirical observations is performed. This is
the source from which cladistic hypotheses receive their
empirical corroboration at the end of the analysis. This is
why the potentially available amount of explanatory
power for the presently most corroborated cladistic hy-
pothesis is directly restricted to the quality and results of
the character analysis.
Since hypotheses of homology do not represent
cladistic hypotheses, the logical linkage of synapomor-
phy and homology has to be revealed. It is shown that
they are not equivalent, but that the former represents a
subclass of the latter. Putative synapomorphies can,
therefore, also be empirically tested with the criterion of
identity. This is very important, because otherwise the
congruence test would not constitute an empirical test.
Only where the hypotheses to be tested against each
other have first passed an empirical test in which they
gained corroboration, the congruence test is not an em-
pirically empty one. And only in such cases are cladistic
hypotheses empirically testable and is phylogenetic re-
search an empirical science.
This paper is also an attempt to evaluate the condi-
tions for justifying a procedure within a falsificationist
approach to phylogeny, that is intimately linked to the
circumstances stated above: the necessity to weight
cladistic characters within a cladistic analysis.
And as the congruence criterion tests hypotheses of
synapomorphy against each other on grounds of their
degree of corroboration gained from the identity test,
these different degrees of corroboration determine the
specific weights given to cladistic characters and charac-
ter state transformations before the cladistic analysis.
This is the only reasonable justification for a weighting
scheme and it also demonstrates the indispensable ne-
cessity of its application. There is no non-weighting but
only a priori weighting of cladistic characters in a falsifi-
cationist approach to phylogeny.
A convention had to be set up to classify cladistic
characters in correspondence with the transformation
type that has caused them, as well as a convention to
classify character states with respect to their identity.
This is not problematic since it does not affect a possible
weighting scheme directly. To be able to justify a
weighting scheme, a proposal has to be stated to the ef-
fect that every class of possible identical character states
has the same weight in terms of its explanatory power
and empirical content. This is a problematic proposal,
since it disregards any effect of different process proba-
bilities of transformations and requires severe testing on
empirical data. A first test is presented in Vogt (2002,
this volume).
On the whole, however, the advantage of the pro-
posed scheme lies in its clearly and unequivocally stated
assumptions. This enables one to discuss them and their
alternatives as well as their impact on the methods of
cladistic analysis.
As a consequence of the present investigation, the
background knowledge that necessarily has to be as-
sumed in every cladistic inference that corresponds with
a falsificationist approach can be summarized as fol-
lows:
1) logical sentence of contradiction
2) methodological criterion of parsimony
3) descent with modification, including knowledge
about reproduction, heredity, speciation and mutation/
recombination
4) determination of the relevant area of matter (do-
main of discourse), including the assumption of the ob-
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servability of characteristics, the categorization of iden-
tical character states into classes of identity, and the as-
signment of the classes of identity to specific types of
mutations/recombinations
5) the proposal to weight all classes of identity equal-
ly in terms of determining the severity of the identity test
(if one wishes to follow the conventional interpretation
of Popper’s falsificationism in phylogenetic research).
When considering morphological data, the necessity
of assumption 4), in particular, gives reason for well-
founded concern. We still have very little knowledge of
the genetic linkage and of the mechanisms of transforma-
tion of morphological characteristics. This knowledge is,
however, fundamental to being able to interpret the phy-
logenetic information content of morphological charac-
teristics and thus to performing a more or less effective
cladistic analysis within the falsificationist approach.
Another problem is the necessity of developing a
methodology that allows a more objective description of
morphological characteristics, so as to be able to test
them more severely on identity. A cladistic analysis of
morphological data is, therefore, only reasonable in those
cases where the number of homoplasies after character
analysis is very low and the general phylogenetic infor-
mation content thus comparatively high. Even though
this sounds like a serious blow, there still are a number of
promising approaches to the possibility of evaluating the
quality of morphological characteristics methodological-
ly within the character analysis (e.g. Neff 1986). This as-
pect will require further investigation.
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